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Abstract 
 
Non-tariff measures such as food safety standards are aimed at protecting consumers’ health 
but may also be used as protectionism tool to limit imports. This study investigates the 
protectionist intent of EU food safety standards using a sample of EU food imports from 
African countries. We formalized protectionism by comparing EU standards to the 
internationally scientific benchmarks. Our results support the hypothesis that heavily import 
dependent sectors are less protected. Further analysis shows no substantial rise in the usage of 
these measures as protectionism tool during the period of financial crisis.   
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1. Introduction 
Trade protectionism involving the deliberate use of government regulations to limit the 
importation of goods and services from third countries has been a popular facet of 
international trade. Prior to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its 
subsequent revisions, extensions, and rounds, protectionism has been attained with the use of 
overly high tariffs on exported goods. However, as a result of the GATT1 agreement, this 
kind of protectionism lost its ground following a decrease in the use of tariffs and the 
consequent rise of non-tariff measures (NTMs) by many countries which shifted towards 
using them as trade barriers (Baldwin, 1970). NTMs take many different forms ranging from 
traditional barriers, such as quotas and subsidies, to more sophisticated and complex ones, 
including technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary2 (SPS) measures, entry 
price controls, among many others.  However, protectionist intent is not usually glaring in 
NTMs as it often is with tariffs since NTMs are often less transparent than tariffs and are, at 
times, linked to non-trade policy objectives3 such as consumer protection. Consequently, 
protectionist intent is more difficult to detect. Such non-trade objectives include the 
legitimate concern for the welfare of the citizenry, in which case the government is mandated 
to protect consumers’ health and the environment by ascertaining that NTMs guarantying a 
certain health and safety level are imposed.  
 
However, such NTMs could also be employed as a tool in protecting domestic producers and 
driving out foreign producers; this is done by using stringent trade protectionism measures to 
drive a wedge between foreign and domestic producers (Baldwin, 1970, 2000). This may 
occur with many food products in which the government seeks to achieve a non-trade 
objective of maximizing consumers’ health and safety, but at the same time sets much more 
stringent food safety standards than required by international benchmarks. Indeed, the 
proliferation and continuous use of some SPS measures on food –  food safety standards –  as 
protectionist tools has been found to inhibit the expansion of exports in global markets for 
many developing countries, particularly Africa (Otsuki, Wilson and Sewedah, 2001; 
Shepherd and Wilson, 2013; Kareem, Brümmer, Martinez-Zarzaso 2016). Consequently, this 
may jeopardize the developmental progress of the continent since deep trade integration is 
widely viewed as the most promising avenue to achieving economic growth (Nicita and 
Rollo, 2015).  
 
There have been a few, but insightful number of studies investigating whether NTMs are 
increasingly used as protectionist tools (Beverelli, Boffa, and Keck, 2014; Calo-Blano and 
Naya, 2005; Grundke and Moser, 2014; Kee, Neagu, and Nicita, 2008; Nordas and Ragoussi, 
2015). Nonetheless, little is known on whether EU’s usage of pesticide standards have 
protectionist intent. The literature on SPS standards have primarily focused on examining the 
effect of minimum quality and compatibility standards on trade flows (Grandal and Shy, 
                                                          
1 GATT agreements and the subsequent post-war GATT rounds (such as the Uruguay and Tokyo rounds) and the need to substantially 
reduce the pervasive protectionism of the 1930’s and expand world trade resulted into increased success in the reduction of visible tariff 
(Rivera-Batiz and Danyang, 1992). 
2 SPS are measures aimed safeguarding human, plants and animals’ health and safety by protecting them from food hazards, pest and 
diseases and other related risks (WTO, 2015). 
3
Such non-trade objective includes achieving certain minimum health and safety level. 
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2001; Otsuki et al., 2001; Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni, 2008; Ferro, Otsuki, and Wilson, 
2015; Fontagné, Orefice, Piermartini, and Rocha., 2015; etcetera). The protectionist usage of 
pesticide standards and their implication for exporting countries is not yet completely 
understood. This can be largely attributed to the difficulty of differentiating these standards’ 
non-trade policy objectives from their trade policy objectives, and a lack of a globally 
accepted benchmark for doing this (Li and Beghin, 2014; Xiong and Beghin, 2014). This 
emanates from the fact that that any of them are contingent protection measures that are used 
in targeting specific sectors without violating the World Trade Organisation (WTO) principle 
of non-discrimination in trade (Miyagiwa, Song, and Vandenbussche, 2016).  
 
While the literature on the protectionist use of food safety standards is scarce, there are a few 
theoretical works available in contrast to the very limited empirical literature. On the 
theoretical side, early studies in this area have qualified protectionism to occur when the 
welfare maximising standards of the domestic country are higher than those of the social 
planner, and vice versa for a lack of protectionism. They demonstrated that domestic policy 
makers set a number of standards in order to maximize both producers and consumers’ 
welfare along with the welfare of some interest groups. These domestic standards are then 
compared to the globally acceptable international standards that a social planner seeking only 
to maximise social welfare inclusive of foreign profits, would have implemented (Fisher and 
Serra, 2000; Marette and Beghin, 2010). 
 
The major conclusion that emerged from these theoretical literature is that standards are 
being used as tools of disguised protectionism to protect domestic producers from 
competition (Fischer and Serra, 2000; Anderson, Damania, and Jackson, 2004; Sturm, 2006; 
Sheldon, 2012). Nevertheless, extensive theoretical underpinnings of some other authors have 
pointed to the fact that standards are not necessarily protectionist, and might at times be 
indicating a lack of protectionism (Tian, 2003; Maertens and Swinnen, 2007; Marette and 
Beghin, 2010; Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2011). The divergent nature of these theoretical 
assertions indicates the need for standards to be empirically analyzed product by product 
before ultimately categorizing them as protectionist tools – a gap which this study attempts to 
fill. 
 
This research contributes to the literature by ascertaining the protectionist intent of EU SPS 
standards on tomatoes and citrus fruits. More specifically, we focus on pesticide standards 
and posit that pesticides standards are a good case study given the fact that they are primarily 
enacted due to a legitimate concern for consumers’ health and safety (the non-trade 
objective). However, they can also be used as protectionist tool by importing countries that 
set overly restrictive standards to attain certain level of protectionism (the trade objective). 
This provides a basis for determining whether or not the chosen level of standards is indeed 
protectionist. Moreover, out of all NTMs, our interest in standards stems from the fact that a 
significant share of traded food products is subject to standards regulated by many importing 
countries, thus making standard an important case study. 
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While the WTO agreements on TBT and SPS measures specify that the measures should not 
be used to create unnecessarily trade barriers and recommend that international standards 
should be used, the agreements also recognize that countries could resort to the usage of more 
stringent domestic standards provided they have a scientific justification. This clause has 
been extensively exploited to the advantage of many developed standard-setting countries to 
the extent that some standards have generated a number of disputes, due to the accusation that 
they are being used as disguised protectionist tools. For instance, there have been a 
significant number of disputes among several Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries and a number of these have been brought to the WTO after 
its dispute settling procedure was established in 1995 (Dee and Ferrantino, 2005). 
 
Given that countries have a free hand to make standards that deviate from the international 
norms, one may pronounce domestic standards that exceed the international socially optimal 
benchmarks as being overly stringent, suboptimal, perhaps protectionist in nature, and 
therefore trade distorting (Fisher and Serra, 2000; Grandal and Shy, 2001; Marette and 
Beghin, 2010). Likewise, domestic standards that are lower than the international socially 
optimal benchmark can be said to be less trade distorting or perhaps trade enhancing, but also 
suboptimal and non-protectionist. However, empirical investigation of the trade effect of such 
suboptimal standards is rare due to the difficulty of distinguishing standards with legitimate 
intent from those with protectionist intent (Li and Beghin, 2014). Thus, this study fills this 
research gap by estimating the protectionism extent of EU pesticide standards relative to their 
globally acceptable benchmark and how this affects the potential of African food exporters to 
establish trade relations with the EU. The most related study in this sense is that of Li and 
Beghin (2014), albeit still with significant differences. Firstly, the focus of their study was on 
the United States (US) rather than the EU. Secondly, their study utilized a cross-section of 
maximum residual limits (MRLs) of pesticides and veterinary drug standards to panels of 
trade flows. As a result, the study misses an important part of heterogeneity in standards. We 
use the newly available panel of pesticide standards from the EU database of pesticides to 
estimate the impact on Africa’s exports. Our study is thus an improvement as the use of panel 
data allows unobserved heterogeneity to be controlled for. Furthermore, to our knowledge, 
this represents the first study of its kind on Africa’s exports.  
 
In this study, we investigate the protectionist intent of EU food safety standards using a 
sample of EU food imports from African countries with a specific focus on tomatoes and 
citrus fruits. These products provide a good case study to analyse protectionism of standards 
with an explicit focus on African countries due to a number of reasons. First, the EU is the 
largest importer of these products. Consequently, this may spur interest groups to lobby the 
EU food standard setting process so as to protect domestic producers, being a marginal 
producer of tropical fruits. Second, the EU remains the top destination for many African 
countries; top exporters of these products tend to originate from African countries due to the 
favourable climatic conditions which give them a comparative advantage in the production of 
these agricultural products. Third, these products are an easy target for protectionist standards 
due to their perishable nature and their susceptibility to many food hazards. 
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This study is motivated by recent literature on firm heterogeneity which reveals that the 
growth of developing countries’ trade was predominantly as a result of the expansion of trade 
along the extensive margin (exporting of existing products to new trade partners or of new 
products to already existing markets) rather than due to the growth in the intensive margin, 
that is, the expansion in the volume of trade to already established partners (Debaere and 
Mostashari, 2010; Reis and Farole, 2012; Nicita and Rollo, 2015). In spite of this assertion, 
we argue that the ability of developing countries to initiate or penetrate new markets might be 
ultimately constrained by the stringent market conditions of importing countries. Thus, 
analysing the impact of EU pesticide standards in the food sector on Africa’s extensive 
margin is crucial to understanding the process of entries and exits in the export markets. For 
instance, studies that look at the impact of EU standards in the food sector on Africa’s 
exports have predominantly focused on the intensive margin (Otsuki, et al., 2001; 
Grebrehewit, Ngqangweni, and Kirsten, 2007). However, the implications of EU food 
regulations have received less attention when it comes to market access at the extensive 
margin of trade. Thus, understanding the effects of EU’s market access conditions on 
pesticides and their effect on potential exporters is important from a policy perspective. 
 
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a theoretical framework to 
analyse the political economy of government’s standards and also presents a simple model of 
trade protectionism. In section 3, we describe the data and develop an index of protectionism 
for standards. Section 4 provides the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the results and 
the final section concludes. 
 
2.0 The Political Economy of Government’s Standards 
Theoretical studies on this issue usually rely on the famous protection for sales model that 
was first developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994) to analyse the political economy of 
trade protection. This political economy model allows for interest groups to influence a 
government’s decisions and is essential to understanding the process of standard setting. 
Thus, to explain standard protectionism, we also rely on a simple model of protection for 
sales to compare government’s public standards to international standards.  
 
2.1. The Protection for Sales Model 
We draw from the Grossman and Helpman (1994) protection for sales model4 of trade to 
provide a political economy explanation for standard protectionism. In the protection for 
sales model (summarized here for expository purposes), we assume a two-country world with 
agricultural trade interactions between a large food importing country (domestic) and a small 
food exporting country (foreign). We further assume that the latter is a price taker and also 
standards taker as it has limited resources to initiate the setting of standards. However, the 
former is a standard setter and imposes its standards on the small country’s food exports; the 
same sets of standards are also applied on domestic producers. Following Grossman and 
Helpman (1994), we make the assumption that food standards are the only type of trade 
policy measures available to the government. By setting the standards, it is assumed that 
                                                          
4 The protection for sale model has also been used in Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2011, 2012) to study the political economy of standards. 
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government care about protecting consumers’ health and safety, and so the government’s 
main objective is to maximize social welfare.  
 
Although by setting standards, government aims to maximize social welfare, this objective is 
also being influenced by lobbyists (both producers and consumers) who seek to shape 
government policies. Producer lobbyists aim to achieve a desired level of protection for 
domestic producers against international competition, and consumer lobbyists aim to 
influence government policy to achieve higher quality product or higher food safety level. As 
such, it is assumed that the government cares about social welfare and wants to maximize 
social welfare but nevertheless also cares about political contributions from these interest 
groups and consequently seeks to maximize their welfare. Since government values both the 
weighted sum of the total level of political contributions from the interest group and also the 
social well-being of the people, the total government objective function is given by the 
summation of social welfare and contributions from each of these lobbyist groups.  
 
It is assumed that there is truthfulness in the political contribution of the lobbying food 
sectors such that the government is given higher contributions if the standards stimulate 
higher producers’ surpluses, and vice versa. Thus, maximising government welfare gives rise 
to the political optimal condition which is posited to depend on the political effectiveness of 
the lobby groups and the associated relative benefits of the standards for the groups, the 
producers’ compliance costs, and consumers’ preferences. According to Swinnen and 
Vandemoortele (2012), these factors might increase or decrease the optimal standards as 
exposited below. Firstly, ceteris paribus, a higher effectiveness leads to a higher standard if 
the lobby group stands to gain from the imposition of a higher standard, and vice versa. 
Secondly, higher compliance costs for domestic producers lead to lobbying for lower 
standards as they have incentives to give less lobby contributions to the government. Higher 
compliance costs also imply larger prices which result in a lower consumer surplus and 
increases lobbying for a lower standard. Higher compliance costs for foreign producers 
relative to domestic producers may motivate producers to give more lobby contributions to 
the government so as to achieve reduce foreign competition and increase economies of scale. 
Thirdly, a shift in the consumers’ preferences for quality and safety can also lead to an 
implementation of a higher standard by the government, and vice versa, assuming that the 
consumers are well-organized.  
 
Alongside the government, we assume that a social planner exists whose objective is solely to 
maximize global social welfare. This, for instance, can be the case with international 
organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) who jointly set standards with the sole aim of maximizing international 
social welfare and whose agenda is void of any protective motive. Likewise, the socially 
optimal standards, which are the globally acceptable benchmark, are obtained when 
government maximizes social welfare. Similar to the analysis of tariff in the traditional trade 
model, the government’s politically chosen trade policy is also compared to the socially 
optimal trade policy in order to clarify what protectionism is (Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 
2011). Here, the chosen government’s standard is pronounced as suboptimal if the politically 
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optimal standard is different from the socially optimal standards set by the social planner in 
the international context. The divergence between these two sets of standards is said to 
depend on some factors such as the political effectiveness of the lobby groups, producers’ 
implementation costs, and consumers’ preference (Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2011, 2012).  
 
Interest groups may lobby either in favour of or against standards, subsequently increasing or 
decreasing the politically optimal standard. In the EU, this is the case for organized retailers 
who seek to influence the standard setting process. In recent times, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) such as the Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth Europe, Compassion in 
World Farming, Ecoropa, and Green League have taken an interest in standard setting and 
implementation and, more generally, in the politics of food.  Their influence is especially 
pervasive in the area of anti-genetically modified organism and pro-organic food campaigns.  
Thus, on the one hand, lobby groups can support the increase in stringency and proliferation 
of standards, thereby raising the politically optimal standards above the socially optimal 
standards that would be implemented by a social planner. On the other hand, producers can 
also lobby for negative protection, that is, a reduction in the number or stringency of 
standards. Effective lobbying will then make the politically optimal standards to be less 
stringent or fewer in number than the socially optimal standards. In other words, two 
suboptimal cases may occur; the first is when the socially optimal standards are lower than 
the politically optimal standards, which describes over- standardization. The second will 
occur when the socially optimal standards are higher than the politically optimal standards, 
which describes under- standardization (Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2011, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, producers might lobby for over-standardization if their cost of complying with 
the standards is relatively low, and they want to enjoy economies of scale and increase 
foreign producers’ cost of complying with standards, thereby giving them diseconomies of 
scale. Effective lobbying by the consumer interest groups might also result in over-
standardization if they value the quality of the product. However, domestic producers might 
lobby for under-standardization or a reduction in standardization if the standards are too 
costly to comply with for them. In addition, producer groups that depend heavily on exported 
goods for their production inputs might have a relative weaker preference to lobby the 
government for a higher standard, and might also lobby for under-standardization. 
  
The protection for sales model thus yields three straightforward implications. (1) The 
politically optimal standards might coincide with the socially optimal standards when all 
lobby groups can attain their maximum surplus income at the social optimum. In this case, 
optimality implies that exporters would not be hurt when politically optimal standards are 
equal to socially optimal standards, even if the latter are trade enhancing or trade inhibiting. 
(2) Under-standardization: for cases in which the politically optimal standards are lower than 
the socially optimal ones, both domestic and foreign producers may benefit from this under-
standardization. The negative impacts of standards on trade are reduced such that the level of 
protection will be directly related to export value. Thus, although under-standardization is 
suboptimal, it is not protectionist from this point of view. (3) Over-standardization: for cases 
in which the politically optimal standards are higher than the socially optimal ones. The 
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higher the level of over-standardization, the harder it becomes for exporters particularly those 
from “small countries” to comply with the importing country’s standards. Thus, in the case of 
a small country, over-standardization will distort trade and give rise to a higher surplus 
income for domestic producers while foreign producers lose out.  As a result, for protected 
industries (if the sector or good is protected), then the level of protection will be inversely 
related to the export value. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In this Section, we first present in sub-Section 3.1 a description of the data and the variables 
used in the empirical analysis. Next, Section 3.2 presents the protectionism index of EU 
standards alongside some descriptive statistics of EU pesticide standards vis à vis those of the 
Codex Alimentarious Commission (hereafter Codex). In addition, we provide an insight into 
the structure of EU production and trade for each of the three products considered in this 
study with a view to understanding the need to protect or not protect the sector.  
 
3.1. Data Description and Sources 
Our dataset covers bilateral trade on three export products between five EU countries and 34 
selected African countries between 2008 and 2013. The three selected products are coded at 
the 6th digit of the Harmonize System (HS) classification, and these are tomatoes (HS code 
070200), oranges (HS code 080510), and limes and lemons (HS code 080550). Bilateral 
exports on these products were obtained from the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS) database. An overview of all importing and exporting countries included in 
the analyses is available in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
 
The pesticide standards used in calculating the extent of protectionism of EU standards 
relative to Codex standards were obtained from both the Europa and Codex websites. More 
specifically, for each product considered in this study, data on all EU pesticide standards for 
the period from 2008 to 2013, which are actively in force, were sourced from the EU 
pesticide database, while the codex pesticide standards were collated from Codex’s database. 
The period of analysis starts in 2008 mainly because the EU pesticide data is not available 
before this year. Data on both distance and language were sourced from the Centre d`Etudes 
Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII), while GDP data was obtained from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Finally, regional trade agreements 
dummies were constructed using data obtained from both the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and the NSF-Kellogg Institute database on economic integration agreements. An 
overview of the variables considered in our empirical application, including their summary 
statistics are displayed in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Exporters' GDP (Billion US Dollars) 58.388 103.015 0.183 522.638 
Importers' GDP (Billion US Dollars) 1130.044 879.092 212.140 2831.800 
Export Value (Million US Dollars) 0.137 1.083 2.20e-08   17.371 
Extensive Margin of Exports (Tomatoes) 0.165  0 1 
Extensive Margin of Exports (Lime & Lemon) 0.193  0 1 
Extensive Margin of Exports (Oranges)  0.292  0 1 
Index of Protectionism (Tomatoes) 1.397 0.085 1.251 1.502 
Index of Protectionism (Lime and Lemon) 0.978 0.203 0.799 1.418 
Index of Protectionism (Oranges) 0.974 0.194 0.799 0.1393 
Initial Status   0.243  0 1 
Distance (‘000 Kilometres) 4.639 1.883 0.562 9.694 
Language 0.234  0 1 
FTA 0.197  0 1 
EPA 0.158  0 1 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: the variable ‘extensive margin of exports’ takes the value of 1 when the export value of the 
corresponding product is positive, zero otherwise. The calculation of the index of protection is described in Section 4.2. Initial status is a 
dummy that takes the value of one when the exported product was successfully exported in the initial period of 2008 zero otherwise. 
Standard deviations are excluded for all dummy variables because these are not informative for them.  
 
3.2. Measuring Protectionism – an Index of Protectionism for Pesticide Standards 
Our measure of SPS standards is based on quantifiable pesticide standards regulated by the 
importing countries. Pesticide standards are SPS standards imposed on food and feed 
products to ensure animal, plant and human safety as well as the safety of the environment. 
The standards are represented in the form of MRLs of pesticides that is scientifically 
permitted for consumption. To avoid using standards as a protectionist tool, the WTO obliged 
its members to employ internationally scientific based standards, such as the Codex’s5 
standards, wherever possible. Thus, we define protectionism as the fraction of a country’s 
standards that are more stringent than the standards internationally recognized by the WTO.  
Following Li and Beghin (2014), using MRLs of pesticides standards, we formalize what 
protectionism is by developing an index of protectionism for standards, which we define as 
the differences in the stringency of a country’s standards to internationally acceptable 
scientific standards. One may categorize standards that exceed the internationally accepted 
ones as being overly stringent, ‘excessive standards’, and protectionist in nature and therefore 
more trade distorting. Given this, our measure of protectionism is constructed by measuring 
the differences in EU standards against an international benchmark. 
 
Since our focus is on food safety, we employed Codex standards - the international food 
safety standards - as the ‘socially optimal’ scientifically based benchmark. We developed a 
simple criterion for protectionism: EU pesticide standards that exceed those set by Codex are 
taken to be protectionist, while those that are laxer than those set by Codex are defined to 
                                                          
5. This is joint FAO and WHO commission. Codex is established to develop internationally standards using scientific knowledge, with the 
aim of protecting consumers’ health and the environment as well as avoiding unnecessary obstacle to trade. 
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indicate a lack of protectionism. Our product level protectionism index for pesticide 
standards is given as:  
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Here, jptP  is the index of protectionism of pesticide k (which ranges from one to n) imposed 
on product p by importer country j over time t; 
jptMRL
EU denotes the maximum residual limits 
of EU pesticide standards at time t;
ptMRL
Codex is the maximum residual limit of the 
international scientific reference pesticide standard at time t. The upper part of the index, 
jptpt MRLMRL
EUCodex  , measures the protectionism of the standard; it was thereafter scaled by 
Codex standards so as to make the index invariant to differences in pesticide limits between 
the EU and Codex. 
 
Equation (1) results in an index that is lower and upper bounded by zero and 718.2e , 
respectively. The lower the EU standards are relative to the international Codex standards, 
the higher the index. The higher the EU standards are relative to the international Codex 
standards, the lower the index. In other words, the index is normalized at one when both EU 
and Codex standards are the same, describing the equilibrium condition; an index above one 
indicates more stringent EU standards relative to those of Codex and describes protectionism; 
finally, an index below one indicates lower stringency of EU standards relative to those of 
Codex – lack of protectionism. Thus, the higher the index is, the higher its stringency, and the 
harder it becomes for exporters to comply with EU standards relative to Codex standards; this 
consequently implies lower exports and vice versa.  The coefficient on the protectionism 
index is expected to be negative if the EU pesticide standards are protectionist relative to 
those of Codex, and positive if vice versa. 
 
There are some issues that were encountered when working with both the EU and Codex 
pesticide standards. The foremost issue is that of unestablished pesticide standards. Appendix 
III of EU Directive 396/2005 stipulates that a default MRL of 0.01 should be applied to 
products for which no pesticide standards are established. So, we substitute this default MRL 
value for non-established pesticide standards in the EU. Codex also has some rare cases 
where certain pesticides that were initially not given an MRL value were assigned one in later 
years. As a result, we are faced with the problem of missing MRLs; this is exacerbated by the 
fact that Codex does not use a default MRL value. In order to solve this issue, we posit that 
African countries exporting to the EU still have to face EU default standards. We therefore 
replaced these missing values with default EU values. Fortunately, such cases are rare and we 
concurred that they will not significantly distort our results. 
 
A second issue is that Codex has only established rules on a subset of standards that are 
regulated by the EU. For example, in 2013, it established about 72 pesticide standards on 
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tomatoes, which is in sharp contrast to the EU which established around 462 standards in the 
same period. To solve this issue when calculating the protectionism index, we were forced to 
consider only pesticide standards that are regulated by both the EU and Codex. This is done 
to produce a consistent list of pesticides regulated by both bodies and allows for ease of 
comparison of their MRLs. When interpreting our results, this caveat should be kept in mind. 
 
3.3. Overview of EU and FAO/WHO Pesticide Safety Standards 
Standards on pesticides are specified in terms of MRLs which provides information about the 
intensity and stringency of the pesticide standards in the food products. The stringency of 
pesticide standards is measured in parts per million (indexed as mg/kg). The higher the MRL, 
the lower the stringency of the pesticide standard, and a decrease in the MRL signals an 
increase in its stringency level. The EU coverage of regulated pesticides is higher in contrast 
to Codex that only establishes rules on a subset of standards regulated by the EU. Hence, for 
ease of comparison, we limited ourselves to only consider the pesticide standards that are 
regulated by both the EU and Codex.  Figures 1, 2 and 3 display the average stringency levels 
of the subsets of pesticides regulated by the EU and Codex between 2008 and 2013 based on 
the index formulated in equation (1).  
 
   Figure 1: Tomatoes MRLs                                      Figure 2: Oranges MRLs  
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 In the case of tomatoes, Figure 1 shows that the regulated MRLs of EU standards are 
consistently below those of Codex for all years, indicating that the EU set lower (stricter) 
pesticide standards on tomatoes relative to the international benchmark of Codex. This is an 
indication of over-standardization and protective standards relative to the international 
standards. However, in the case of oranges, and limes and lemons, as shown in Figures 2 and 
3, the EU standards are only more stringent than those of Codex in 2011 and 2013. There is a 
significant presence of under-standardization as the stringency is below that of Codex in the 
other years. In other words, there are indications of protectionism in 2011 and 2013 and lack 
of protectionism in other years. Thus, the overall impact is an empirical one. 
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Figure 3: Lime and Lemon MRLs                 Figure 4: Index of Pesticides Protectionism 
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Finally, in Figure 4, we depict the index of protectionism of pesticide standards as formulated 
in equation (1). As noted earlier, the index is bounded between 0 and 0.278 with an index 
above one indicating more stringent EU standards relative to those of Codex; an index below 
one indicates lower stringency of EU standards relative to those of Codex. As shown in 
Figure 4, the indices of protection for both oranges and limes and lemons overlay each other 
except in 2010 when the two indices noticeably differ. Clearly, for both oranges, and limes 
and lemons, their indices always lie below one with the exception of 2013, indicating 
evidence of lack of protectionism for all years apart from 2013. However, in the case of 
tomatoes, the index lies above the value of one for all years which might be an indication of 
protectionism. Whether or not these assertions are true will be empirically ascertained in the 
empirical section.  
 
3.4. Structure of EU Production and Trade in the Selected Products  
The EU is an important importer of fresh fruits and vegetables. It is a net importer, recording 
a constant trade deficit in fresh and processed fruits and vegetables since 1999 with the 
deficit increasing from a value of 8.7 billion Euros in 1999 to 11.9 billion in 2011 (EC, 
2014). However, trade balance is revealed to be worsening in the fresh fruit sector, while it is 
more or less constant and, at times, slightly improving in the vegetable and processed fruit 
sectors. This deficit is due to the growth of imports which are uncompensated by EU exports 
due to the fact that the EU is a marginal producer of tropical fruits and vegetables.  
 
With regard to citrus, there is a high reliance on imports due to the fact that citrus fruit 
production in the EU is restricted by unfavourable climatic conditions. Within the EU, a high 
percentage of citrus fruit production originates in Spain, amounting to around 59.8% (EC, 
2014). In terms of composition, citrus, particularly oranges constitute a top imported product 
for the EU, with the main exporters being South Africa, Egypt, and Morocco. South Africa is 
one of the major suppliers of oranges to the EU, supplying the EU market from June until 
October when the harvest starts in the Northern Hemisphere (Gain, 2015). However, in 2014 
there was an 11.5% decrease in imports from South Africa since May 27, 2014. This 
followed the European Commission’s (EC) increased control measures on South Africa’s 
citrus imports due to the perceived health risks relating to black spot diseases by the EC. This 
resulted in decreased orange imports from South Africa.   
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Tables 2 and 3 show the trends in the production and trade of the products focused on in this 
study. On the production side, Table 2 shows that between 2008 and 2013, a yearly average 
of around 6629.8 thousand tonnes of oranges were produced, with Spain, Italy, and Greece 
accounting for about 96% of the total production with a share of 46.7, 36.4% and 13.2%, 
respectively. During this period, 4% of production was exported to third countries amounting 
to around 933 million Euros; meanwhile, the total import cumulated to a value of about 
3007.1 million Euro (Table 3).   
 
Similar trends also occur for limes and lemons. Between 2008 and 2013, yearly production of 
limes and lemons totalled an average of 1248.4 thousand tonnes (Table 2) with 96% of total 
production concentrated in Spain (57%), Italy (36.7%) and Greece (3.9%). 5.7% of the total 
production of limes and lemons were exported to extra EU countries, representing a yearly 
value of 59.7 million Euros. 
 
Table 2: Structure of Production of the Selected EU Products, averaged 2008 to 2013 
 Oranges Limes and Lemons Tomatoes 
 Tonnes 
(‘000) 
Share in 
EU (%) 
Tonnes 
(‘000) 
Share in 
EU (%) 
Tonnes 
(‘000) 
Share in 
EU (%) 
Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 231.0 1.5 
Bulgaria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 111.3 0.7 
Czech Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.5 0.1 
Denmark 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.1 
Germany  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 68.7 0.5 
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 
Ireland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 0.0 
Greece 878.4 13.2 48.3 3.9 1275.0 8.5 
Spain 3098.2 46.7 712.2 57.0 4099.5 27.3 
France 3.3 0.1 2.8 0.2 651.2 4.3 
Croatia 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.7 0.1 
Italy 2410.6 36.4 458.7 36.7 5800.7 38.6 
Cyprus 35.9 0.5 12.9 1.0 18.1 0.1 
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.1 
Luxembourg 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 156.8 1.0 
Malta 1.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 13.2 0.1 
Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 795.0 5.3 
Austria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.3 0.3 
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 500.9 3.3 
Portugal 201.8 3.0 12.9 1.0 638.1 4.2 
Romania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 495.7 3.3 
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 
Slovakia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.3 0.1 
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Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.2 0.3 
Sweden 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 0.0 
United Kingdom 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
EU 28 6629.8 100.0 1248.4 100.0 15030.0 100.0 
Source: Eurostat.  
 
However, as depicted in Table 3, EU’s average yearly imports of limes and lemons imports  
(380.3 million Euros) were relatively higher than its average yearly exports (59.7 million 
Euros), amounting to an average yearly trade deficit of 320.6 million Euros. The figures for 
both limes and lemons, and oranges also indicate that the EU is a net importer, with a 
significant trade deficit in each product, as the EU relies extensively on imports to satisfy 
domestic demand. Thus, our hypothesis is that the sector might be less protected. In other 
words, the EU’s heavy dependence on third countries for its domestic consumption might 
undermine the relative influence of lobbyists on the government, and or prompt the 
government to lower its standards to allow more imports from third countries. 
 
Table 3: Structure of Trade with Extra EU countries, 2008 to 2013 
 Oranges Limes and Lemons Tomatoes 
 Sum Average Sum Average Sum Average 
Production (‘000 tons) 39778.7 6629.8 7490.2 1248.4 90179.8 15,030 
Volume Exported (‘000 tons) 1590.1 256.0 426.1 71.0 1364.1 227.3 
% of Production Exported 4.0 4.0 5.69 5.69 1.5 1.5 
Imports (Value million EUR) 3007.1 501.2 2282.1 380.3 2247.3 374.5 
Exports (Value million EUR) 933.0 155.5 358.4 59.7 1668.3 278.0 
Trade Balance (Value million EUR) -2074.1 -345.7 -1923.7 -320.6 -579 -96.5 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
The case of tomatoes is somewhat different. It remains EU’s top imported vegetable, 
constituting the highest share of its fresh vegetables imports, amounting to around one fifth of 
its vegetable imports (EC, 2014). The EU exports of fresh vegetables is also dominated by 
tomatoes, however, this is not enough to achieve a trade balance. According to the Eurostat 
data, major exporters to the EU are Morocco and Egypt, with Morocco supplying about 80% 
of EU imports of the product. Unlike citrus products which are mainly tropical fruits, 
tomatoes are cultivated en masse by some Southern EU countries due to favourable weather 
conditions. This is complemented by production from all season greenhouses in countries 
such as Belgium and the Netherlands, reducing an overreliance on imports in contrast to what 
was seen in the cases of oranges, and limes and lemons. As provided in Table 2, the total 
production between 2008 and 2013 amounts to 90179 thousand tones with major producers 
accounting for 91% of production; major producing countries include Italy (38.6%), Spain 
(27.3), Greece (8.5%), France (4.3%), the Netherlands (5.3%), Portugal (4.2%), and Romania 
(3.3%). Tomato’s production is more than twice as large as both orange production, and lime 
and lemon production with only 1.5% of it being exported and the rest being consumed 
domestically. The huge domestic production of tomatoes relative to the other citrus products 
reduces the need for excessive imports and might explain why the sectors’ total trade deficit 
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between 2008 and 2013 of 579 million Euros, which is reported in the last row of Table 3 is 
far below the deficits for oranges and limes and lemons.  
 
Thus, unlike citrus, the EU is not over-dependent on imports to satisfy tomato consumption; 
as a result, it may yield more to lobbyists who seeks to influence the EC to set stringent 
standards so as to increase exporters’ implementation costs and therefore erode their market 
competitiveness. However, it is not clear if stringent MRLs set by the EU since 2008 are 
influenced by lobbyists due to the difficulty of differentiating standards’ trade from non-trade 
objectives. Thus, a testable hypothesis in this study is that protectionism decreases or 
vanishes altogether with overdependence on imports and vice versa. For instance, concerning 
products where the EU heavily (lightly) depends on foreign exported goods for its domestic 
consumption, under-standardization (over-standardization) can result as the relative influence 
of lobbyist groups may be weaker (stronger). Thus, we hypothesized that the two selected 
citrus fruit sectors are under-protected due to the EU’s heavy import dependence and the 
tomato sector is hypothesized to be over-protected due to EU’s relatively less reliance on its 
imports.   
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
To investigate the protectionist intent of EU’s food safety standards, we employ the gravity 
model which predicts that bilateral exports between country pairs is explained by exporters’ 
and importers’ economic masses and geographical distance between the country pairs, as well 
as other factors that increase or inhibit trade (Pöyhönen, 1962; Anderson, 1979; Anderson 
and Wincoop, 2003). 
 
4.1. Model Specification 
Our empirical strategy is to determine if standards are used as protectionist tool in restricting 
trade by focusing on the extensive margin of Africa’s exports to the EU. The theoretical 
model for our analysis is based on the new-new trade’s concept of firm heterogeneity which 
shows that due to the heterogeneous behaviour of firms, a small fraction of firms finds it 
profitable to export while others choose not to as they are less productive (Melitz, 2003; 
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008). This thus gives rise to positive and zero trade flows. 
This is because EU market conditions on food might affect African countries’ probability of 
exporting to the EU, with productive firms exporting and non-productive firms choosing not 
to export. Our empirical strategy is therefore to measure the effect of EU food regulations on 
Africa’s probability to export. Our model is similar to that of Nicita and Rollo (2015), which 
analysed the impacts of tariffs on the extensive margin of trade for sub-Saharan exports. The 
extensive margin is defined as the establishment of new trade relationships and can arise from 
exporting a product to new partners or markets, exporting new products or new varieties to 
existing markets, or exporting new products to new markets (Hummels and Klenow, 2005). 
Similar to Helpman et al., (2008), we used a dummy variable capturing the probability of 
exporting (an export participation dummy variable) to establish if there is an increase or 
decrease in the creation of trade relationships. 
 
16 
 
We employ a probabilistic model to explore the implications of food safety standards on the 
probability of exporting (extensive margin). Moreover, our bilateral export data contains 
many zeros, thus allowing us to exploit the information contained in the zero trade flows 
along the extensive margin. Following Helpman et al. 2008, to quantify the trade impacts at 
the extensive margin, a probit model is specified as follows:  
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Equation (2) is a probabilistic model which determines the binary decision of whether to 
trade or not. The subscripts tpji ,,,  denote exporter, importer, product and time, 
respectively, while ln denotes natural logarithm. The dependent variable ijpt  is the 
probability that country i exports product t to country j at time t, conditional on the observed 
variables ijptx ; ijptE  is a binary variable which equals one )1( ijptE when country i  exports 
product p to country j in year t, and zero when it does not )0( ijptE , where itY and jtY  are 
the importing and exporting countries’ GDP respectively, measured in US dollars. Similar to 
Nicita and Rollo (2015), we included a proxy of the initial export status of the product 
(Initial_Statusijp) which is a dummy given the value of one when the exported product was 
successfully exported in the initial period of 2008 (the start of the harmonization of EU food 
regulations), and zero otherwise. The intuition is that products already exported in the year 
2008 have a high probability of being exported in subsequent years. 
 
jptP  is the index of protectionism of pesticides imposed on product p by country j over time t. 
It captures the extent of protectionism of EU pesticide standards relative to Codex standards 
calculated from equation (1). T, L and O are controls for product dummies introduced to 
capture product effects. Here, T  is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
product is tomato, zero otherwise; L  is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
product is lime and lemon, zero otherwise; while O  is a dummy variable that takes one if the 
product is orange, zero otherwise. ,*TPjpt  LPjpt *  and OPjpt *  are interaction terms 
between the index of protectionism and each of the three product dummies. These interaction 
terms allow us to test whether the effect of the target variable is different across products. 
 
ijDist  denotes the geographical distance between countries i and j. ijLang  is a dummy 
variable that assumes the value of one when the exporting and importing countries share 
similar language, zero otherwise. ijtFTA  and ijtEPA are trade agreement variables included in 
our analysis to capture the depth of EU’s trade agreements with the participating African 
countries. Two major trade agreements that the EU has undertaken with African countries are 
identified. These are the free trade agreements (FTA) and the more recent interim economic 
partnership agreement (EPA). FTA is a dummy variable given the value of one if the African 
country has a FTA in force with the EU, zero otherwise. EPA is a dummy variable that takes 
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the value of one if any African country in our sample has ratified an EPA with the EU, zero 
otherwise. Lastly, p denotes product fixed-effects, while ijpt  is the error term of the model. 
 
As a further step in our analysis, we included variables capturing EU’s “relative comparative 
advantage” of each product considered in the analysis. Comparative advantage in a product is 
determined using the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index. This allows us to 
ascertain whether or not protectionism is lower for those products for which the EU does not 
have comparative advantage in and is therefore more interested in importing. One common 
measure of the RCA is the popular Balassa (1965) revealed comparative advantage (BRCA) 
index. This index is calculated as the market share of a country’s export product in world 
export to the market share of the country’s total exports in world exports.  However, a 
limitation of the BRCA index is that it has been identified as being problematic and limited in 
comparative analysis (Deardoff, 1994; Yeats, 1985). In addition, the index also has a 
symmetric problem due to the fact that it has a lower bound of zero but no upper bound; 
signifying that the same BRCA value will imply different levels of comparative advantage 
for different countries and or commodities, thereby limiting the index’s comparability across 
countries and commodities (Deardoff, 1994; Yeats, 1985). 
 
Given the limitations of the Balassa’s index, this study thus employs the normalised revealed 
comparative advantage (NRCA) developed by Yu, Cai, and Leung (2009), which has an 
advantage over the Balassa’s index because it allows a more accurate comparison across 
countries, time and products (Yu et al., 2009).  The NRCA normalises changes in country j’s 
export of product p by the world exports of all commodity, and is denoted as: 
             2)(
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NRCA                                                                     (3) 
In equation (3), the subscripts wtpj ,,,  denote importer, product and time and world 
respectively, while ln is the logarithm. jptX  is country j’s (EU) export of product p at time t; 
jtX  is country j’s export of all commodities at time t; wptX  is denotes world exports of 
product p at time t; and wtX  is world’s exports of all commodities over time. Positive 
(negative) values of the NRCA index implies that countries j reveals a comparative advantage 
(disadvantage) in product p; and the more positive (negative) the index is, the higher (lower) 
the comparative advantage (disadvantage) the country has in the given product, and vice 
versa.  
 
To obtain consistent estimates, we have controlled for multilateral trade resistance terms, 
theoretically modelled by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). To do this we have used the 
Baier and Bergstrand (2010) first order Taylor series log-linear approximation of the bilateral 
trade cost. Their approach has been shown to produce estimates that are close to those 
obtained in the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) structurally iterated least squares method 
(Baier and Bergstrand, 2006; Nelson and Egger, 2010). Controlling for multilateral resistance 
terms (MRT) using Baier and Bergstrand (2010) simple average approach, we applied a first 
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order Taylor series expansion to all bilateral trade costs and thereafter used the newly 
transformed variables in the regression. In line with Baier and Bergstrand (2010), each trade 
cost variable is transformed using the following approximations: 
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The right hand side variables in equations (4) to (8) are analogous to the fixed exporte96*;ir-
year and importer-year effects (Nelson and Egger, 2010).  Using the FTA variable as an 
example, the second term on the right hand side of equation (8) is the average distance of 
exporter i from all its trading partners. The third term on the right hand side is the average 
distance of a given importer j from all trading partners.  The last term denotes world trade 
resistance, capturing the trade costs between all country pairs. A similar definition holds for 
the other transformed equations. Substituting equations (4) through (8) into (2) gives a 
theoretically consistent gravity model that accounts for the influence of MRT as:  
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5. Results and Discussion  
(A) Protectionist Extent of EU Standards 
Table 4 presents the estimates of the extensive margin of EU-African trade. Using the probit 
model, in colunm (1), we provide the estimated results of our model with controls for both 
the importers’ NRCA and the interaction term between the NRCA and the index of 
protectionism excluded. In column (2), we ascertain the robustness of the results in column 
(1) using the linear probability model. In column (3), we controlled for both importers’ 
NRCA and the interaction term between the NRCA and the index of protectionism and 
estimated the regression using the probit model; and in column (4), we again controlled for 
the both variables and estimated our model using the linear probability model. 
To begin with, estimates obtained from estimating equation (8) using the probit model are 
reported in column (1) of the table. For comparison and robustness, we had also employed 
the linear probability model to provide a check on the results from the probit model. Using 
the 'margin' command in Stata, we calculated and reported the average predicted probabilities 
of the coefficients of the linear probability model. As shown by the estimates from both 
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columns (1) and (2), for all the products, the gravity covariate has the expected sign for the 
products considered in this study. Physical distance between country pairs inhibits export 
potential, while sharing the same language and membership in FTA with the EU increase 
Africa’s exports at the extensive margin. However, membership in EPA is positively related 
to trade flows but does not significantly increase the exports of these particular products.  In 
addition, for all products, our results point out that the decision on whether to export to the 
EU largely depends on whether the product was already exported in the initial period of 2008 
when harmonization of pesticides standards in the EU started (Initial_Status). In other words, 
products already exported in 2008 have a high probability of being exported in subsequent 
years, whether or not the standard is overprotective.  
The coefficient of the variable of interest, which measures the protectionism of pesticide 
standards, is differently signed across products indicating that the decision to protect a 
product is product specific. As a starting point, we conducted statistical test of equality of 
slopes to check if each of the coefficient on the index of protectionism on all the three 
products is significantly different from one another. In essence, the test is testing the equality 
of slope between the coefficient of the protectionism index of tomatoes versus those of lime 
and oranges. The null hypothesis here is that the index of protectionism of tomatoes = index 
of protectionism of oranges = index of protectionism of limes and lemons. The probability 
values of the test statistics are statistically significant at 1%, and based on this, we reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients on the index of protectionism on all the three products 
considered are not significantly different from one another. For each regression model, the 
probability values of the test statistics are reported at the bottom of Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Protectionist Extent of EU Standards Relative to International Benchmarks 
Dependent Variable: ijpt  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exporters’ GDP 0.070 0.007 0.059 0.005 
 (0.060) (0.010) (0.060) (0.010) 
Importers’ GDP 0.422** 0.053** 0.390** 0.046** 
 (0.141) (0.019) (0.139) (0.020) 
Protectionism Measure (Tomato) -0.909** -0.130** -1.189** -0.182** 
 (0.454) (0.061) (0.506) (0.069) 
Protectionism Measure (Lime and Lemon) 0.679*** 0.097*** 0.609*** 0.085** 
 (0.164) (0.028) (0.165) (0.028) 
Protectionism Measure (Orange) 0.435** 0.071**     0.306 0.048 
 (0.170) (0.030) (0.194) (0.031) 
Initial_Status 0.649*** 0.115*** 0.666*** 0.118*** 
 (0.117) (0.022) (0.116) (0.022) 
Distance -3.503*** -0.610*** -3.224*** -0.591*** 
 (0.725) (0.125) (0.702) (0.118) 
Language 2.857*** 0.456*** 2.844*** 0.452*** 
 (0.421) (0.057) (0.420) (0.057) 
FTA 1.449** 0.156** 1.430** 0.156** 
 (0.719) (0.059) (0.702) (0.059) 
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EPA 0.998 0.117 1.187 0.150 
 (8.576) (0.818) (8.569) (0.835) 
NRCA    4649.118 847.699 
   (3093.975) (574.423) 
NRCA* Protectionism Measure   7122.765 1587.024 
   (4705.412) (886.440) 
Constant -15.238*** -1.454** -14.253*** -1.258** 
 (4.147) (0.550) (4.074) (0.564) 
Equality Test  10.69** 11.430** 11.83** 13.530** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
R-square/Pseudo R-square 0.193 0.174 0.198 0.185 
Product Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2310 2310 2310 2310 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; clustered robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by importer, exporter and year. Product 
dummies not reported but were included in all regression models. R-square coefficients directly obtained from Stata are reported for the 
linear probability regressions, while McFadden R-square (Pseudo R-square) are calculated for the probit regressions. 
 
In the case of tomato exports, the estimated coefficient on the protectionism index is negative 
and statistically significant; this points to the evidence that EU pesticide standards on 
tomatoes are actually protectionist as they are more stringent than the international 
benchmark stipulated by Codex.  In essence, the negative coefficient reinforces the fact that 
they have demand inhibiting effects on potential African exporters, preventing them from 
establishing trade relationships with the EU and from taking advantage of the preferential 
access the EU usually grant to Africa’s exports. This result is an indication of over-
standardization which is an indication that the EU might have set very stringent and low 
pesticide residue limits on tomatoes due to lobbying from domestic producer groups seeking 
to protect their interests. 
 
While the tomato sector is relatively less import dependent and is revealed to be over-
protected, the case for oranges and limes and lemons is somewhat different. The estimated 
coefficients on their protectionism index are positive and significant, indicating that EU 
standards do not have protectionist intent. These EU standards have a demand enhancing 
effect; they are capable of stimulating new trade relations with the potential to enhance trade 
for new and potential African exporters targeting EU markets. Given the set of Codex’s 
standards considered in this study, the corresponding EU standards seem to be less stringent 
relative to those regulated by Codex. Thus, for these two products, EU pesticide regulations 
represent legitimate concerns for consumers’ health and safety and do not necessarily imply 
protectionism against imports. Similar results were reported by Xiong and Beghin (2014) for 
US standards.  
 
One important explanation for this result was provided by Marette and Beghin (2010) who 
posited that such a lack of protectionism might occur if producers and exporters from 
exporting countries are more cost efficient in complying with standards than domestic 
producers. However, in the case of African countries, this explanation is less tenable as many 
of them cannot meet some of the standards set by the EU due to a lack of financial, technical 
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and qualified labour (Jaffee and Henson, 2004; Henson and Wilson, 2005). A much more 
tenable explanation for this result is that domestic policymakers in the EU may choose 
relatively lower standards than an international social planner; this could serve to explain in 
part the observed results. For instance, compared to tomatoes, the EU are heavily dependent 
on third countries’ citrus fruits for domestic consumption and processing. Due to the large 
numbers of imports and heavy dependence on foreign exported citrus for domestic juice 
production, the relative influence of lobbyists might be weaker on the government such that 
the government might be prompted to lower standards so as to allow more imports. In other 
words, unlike tomatoes, the EU has relatively low comparative advantage in the producing 
citrus due to unfavourable weather conditions; instead they depend heavily on imports to 
satisfy the domestic consumption of these fruits and thus, might be less yielding to lobbyists 
who seek to influence the EC to set stringent standards. This might even give rise to under-
standardization in order to allow more imports. Thus, our results support the hypothesis that 
protectionism decreases or altogether vanishes with overdependence on imports and vice 
versa. 
 
As a further step in our analysis, we investigated if protectionism is lower for products in 
which the EU has a lower RCA. As a starting point, we provided graphical analyses (Figures 
5, 6 and 7) to enable us to get a clear picture of products and or EU countries that have 
comparative advantage (disadvantage) in each of the products that are considered in this 
study. The pattern of comparative advantage is depicted based on the NRCA index such that 
a positive value of the index indicates comparative advantage and negative values denote 
comparative disadvantage. A clear look at the figures shows that all EU countries have 
comparative advantage in the production of tomatoes except France in 2008; all the importing 
countries have comparative disadvantage in limes and lemons except for Spain and the 
Netherlands; and in the case of oranges, only Spain has a very high comparative advantage in 
oranges while the Netherlands and Portugal relatively weaker comparative advantage and the 
remaining countries have comparative disadvantage.    
                                                   
Figure 5: Pattern of Comparative Advantage in Tomatoes       Figure 6: Pattern of Comparative Advantage in Lime & Lemon        Figure 7: Pattern of Comparative Advantage in Oranges  
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Source: Authors’ Computation based on trade data sourced from WITS (2008 to 2013)  
 
Now, to ascertain if protectionism is lower for products in which the EU has lower revealed 
comparative advantage in, we simply include the NRCA index and the interaction of the 
NRCA index with the index of protectionism. The results of this exercise estimated using the 
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probit model are reported in column (3) of Table 4. For robustness, in column (4) we have 
also report the marginal effects of the estimated coefficient from the linear probability model. 
First, in relation to the new results, the sign and magnitude of all variables are almost 
comparable to those obtained in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. An exception is the index of 
protectionism for oranges which now turns out to be statistically insignificant. However, the 
basic conclusion in regards to the index not reducing the probability of exporting oranges to 
the EU by African countries still holds. 
Second, regarding the new variables, a prior, we expected the coefficient on the NRCA to be 
negative and statistically insignificant on the probability to export, while its interaction with 
the protectionism index should also be negative and statistically significant signifying that 
having a higher revealed comparative advantage in a product would make one to protect it 
more, thus resulting in a lower probability to export to the EU for the African countries. 
However, on the contrary, the coefficients of the variable of interests of the NRCA and its 
interaction with the index of protectionism both turn out to be positive and statistically 
insignificant on the probability of the African countries to export to the EU. This results 
signifies that EU's revealed comparative advantage does not significantly determine its 
pattern of protection for the products considered in this study.   
For robustness, we have also estimated our model using the linear probability model and have 
reported the average predicted probabilities of the coefficients from the model. Remarkably, 
similar conclusion was derived from the model as reported in column (4) of Table 4.  
 
(B) Extent of Protectionism during the Financial Crisis 
In a further analysis, we investigate the assertions that many developed countries resorted to 
using protectionist NTMs both during and after the financial crisis (Bown, 2011; Datt, 
Hoekman, and Malouche, 2011; OECD, 2010). Thus, to ascertain if this occurred in the case 
of standards, we had added an interaction term between the index of protectionism and the 
year of the crisis (2008). This we did by generating a dummy variable which equals one for 
the financial crisis period and zero otherwise. The dummy variable is then interacted with the 
index of protectionism variable. Thereafter, we ran our regression and included the 
interaction term and the single year dummy capturing the year of the financial crisis. Table 5 
presents the estimates differentiating the extent of protectionism during the financial period 
using both the probit and linear probability models. Column (1) provides the estimated results 
using the probit model while column (2) provides the estimated average probabilities of 
exporting obtained from the linear probability model. 
 
Table 5: Extent of Protectionism during and after the 2008/2009 Financial Crisis. 
Dependent Variable: ijpt  (1) (2) 
Exporters’ GDP 0.060 0.005 
 (0.061) (0.010) 
Importers’ GDP 0.411** 0.047** 
 (0.142) (0.020) 
Protectionism Measure (Tomato) -1.535** -0.226** 
 (0.544) (0.078) 
Protectionism Measure (Lime and Lemon) 0.524** 0.072** 
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 (0.166) (0.027) 
Protectionism Measure (Orange) 0.202 0.033 
 (0.200) (0.031) 
Financial Crisis’s Year dummy 0.754* -0.068 
         (0.394) (0.048) 
Protectionism Measure* Financial Crisis’s Year Dummy -0.754 -0.059 
 (1.281) (0.156) 
Initial_Status 0.750*** 0.122*** 
 (0.117) (0.022) 
Distance -3.182*** -0.585*** 
 (0.713) (0.118) 
Language 2.872*** 0.451*** 
 (0.430) (0.057) 
FTA 0.631 0.089 
 (0.655) (0.066) 
EPA -4.196 -0.263 
 (8.197) (0.782) 
NRCA 4843.421 854.420 
 (3144.650) (574.827) 
NRCA*Protectionism Measure 6955.124 1578.673 
 (4785.474) (887.514) 
Constant -14.798*** -1.275** 
 (4.178) (0.566) 
Equality Test     13.530*** 13.030*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
R-square/Psuedo R-square 0.205 0.186 
Observations 2310 2310 
Clustered robust standard errors are in brackets and * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Product dummies not reported but were included in 
all regression models. R-square coefficients directly obtained from Stata are reported for the linear probability regression model, while 
McFadden’s R-square (pseudo R-square) are calculated for the probit model. 
 
In relation to the new results, the sign and magnitude of all variables are almost comparable 
to those obtained in Table 4. However, the inclusion of the new variables yields some 
interesting results. For the probit regression model, the coefficient on the single financial 
crisis year dummy reveals a statistically significant decline in the probability of exporting 
from Africa to the EU during the financial crisis. However, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant in the linear probability model.  However, more importantly, our main variable of 
interest, which is the interaction of the financial year dummy variable and the index of 
protectionism turns out to be negative but statistically insignificant in both the probit and 
linear probability models as reported respectively in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5. These 
estimated coefficients in both the two regression models thus show that the EU’s usage of 
food standards during the financial crisis does not significantly affect the probability of 
Africa’s exports to the EU for the products selected in this study. These results thus refute the 
claim that the EU food standards were used as protectionist tools during the financial crisis.  
These results support that of the WTO report of 2009 which finds that none of its Member 
states have resorted into a widespread usage of trade protectionism or trade restrictions 
during the global financial crisis (WTO, 2009). Similar result was obtained by Hoekman 
(2012) who also affirm that there was no substantial rise in the level of trade protection 
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during the financial crisis but that a strong wave of trade protectionism in many developed 
countries after the crisis. 
 
5.1. Robustness Check 
We checked the robustness of our results to an alternative estimation technique. We have 
previously employed a probabilistic model to investigate the extent of protection on Africa’s 
binary export decision of whether to trade with the EU or not. However, while it is true that 
the decision not to export (and the consequential occurrence of zeros in export flows to the 
EU) by many of these exporting countries may be in part attributed to over-protective 
standards, it may also be due to the statistical recording format. For instance, we have used 
the United Nations Commodity Trade (UN COMTRADE) statistical database of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that was housed in WITS; some 
literature has reported that export values that are below a certain threshold are rounded down 
and are thus recorded as zeros (Frankel, 1997). If some of the zeros in our data are due to this 
statistical recording format, this implies that some of the export data has been censored6 
below zero. Thus, as a robustness check, we employed the Tobit model which is well-suited 
to deal with such situations.  
 
The regression models reported in Table 4 were again replicated using the Tobit model. More 
specifically, similar to what was done in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, first, we have 
estimated a model in which we excluded both the NRCA index and the interaction of the 
NRCA index with the index of protectionism. Second, similar to the regression models in 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, we had also estimated a model in which we now included the 
importers’ NRCA index and the interaction of the NRCA index with the index of 
protectionism to ascertain if protectionism is lower for products in which the EU has lower 
RCA in. The results using the Tobit model are presented in Table 6. Column (1) of Table 6 
gives the estimated results omitting the importers’ NRCA index and the interaction of the 
NRCA index with the index of protectionism. In column (2), we had included the NRCA 
index and its interaction with the index of protectionism. 
 
Table 6: Robustness to a Different Estimation Technique – using Tobit Model 
Dependent Variable: ijpt  (1) (2) 
Exporters’ GDP 0.055 0.047 
 (0.043) (0.043) 
Importers’ GDP 0.274** 0.252** 
 (0.107) (0.105) 
Protectionism Measure (Tomato) -0.582* -0.763** 
 (0.313) (0.343) 
Protectionism Measure (Lime and Lemon) 0.446*** 0.404*** 
 (0.118) (0.118) 
                                                          
6This implies that some of the actual trade flow observations were not included in the trade matrix or have been recorded as zeros as they 
fell below a minimum predetermined threshold. Any trade flow value that is less than a certain predetermined threshold is recorded as zero, 
while other observations that are equal to or greater than the threshold are recorded as their actual values. 
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Protectionism Measure (Orange) 0.284** 0.192 
 (0.105) (0.125) 
Initial_Status 0.389*** 0.396*** 
 (0.073) (0.073) 
Distance -2.314*** -2.168*** 
 (0.547) (0.510) 
Language 1.647*** 1.643*** 
 (0.283) (0.291) 
FTA 0.973 0.978 
 (0.690) (0.679) 
EPA 2.005 2.146 
 (7.595) (7.543) 
NRCA  2658.543 
  (2002.537) 
NRCA*Protectionism Measure  4286.242 
  (2747.879) 
Constant -10.161** -9.705** 
      (3.226) (3.135) 
Equality Test 9.130** 10.380** 
 (0.010) (0.006) 
Pseudo R-square 0.250 0.246 
Observations 2310 2310 
Bootstrap clustered robust standard errors are in brackets and * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0; Product dummies not reported but were 
included in all regression models. McFadden’s pseudo R-square are calculated and reported for the tobit regressions. 
 
 
Column (1) of Table 6 gives the estimated results omitting the importers’ NRCA index and 
the interaction of the NRCA index with the index of protectionism. Remarkably, the 
estimates on the coefficients of the index of protectionism remain similar to those previously 
obtained in Table 4 in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4, using both the probit and linear 
probability model, respectively. Furthermore, in column (2), we had included the NRCA 
index and its interaction with the index of protectionism to check if protectionism would be 
higher for products that the EU has lower revealed comparative advantage in, and is less 
interested in importing. The results from the tobit model as reported in column (2) of Table 5 
is also in similitude to the estimates previously reported in columns (3) and (4) in Table 4, 
using the probit and linear probability model, respectively. In sum, these results imply that 
even if some of the zeros in the data are as a result of statistical zeros and not because of the 
inability to meet the standards (true zeros), the basic conclusions of the results that were 
obtained in Table 4 remain the same, indicating that the previous results are robust even with 
the presence of statistical zeros. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study provides some first empirics on the extent of protectionism of EU pesticide 
standards relative to those of Codex, which serve as the international benchmark 
recommended by the WHO and FAO. Using a sample of African countries, EU tomato 
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standards are found to exhibit protectionist tendencies as they are more stringent than their 
Codex counterpart. However, in the case of oranges, and limes and lemons, these export 
products indicate a lack of protectionism in relation to firms’ decisions to export; this fact 
points to the indication that EU pesticide regulations may be aimed solely at addressing 
legitimate concerns for human health and safety and do not necessarily address protectionist 
concerns. 
 
Our results show that tomatoes represent a relatively less import dependent product which is 
over-protected; meanwhile oranges and limes and lemons represent heavily import dependent 
product which is under-protected. Thus, our results support the hypothesis that protectionism 
vanishes with overdependence on imports and vice versa. The implication of our findings 
highlights the fact that importing countries’ standards are not always protectionist and can 
indicate a lack of protectionism relative to internationally acceptable standards. In other 
words, standards are not necessarily always problematic or protectionist as widely portrayed 
in the literature. The protectionist intent of a standard is product specific, indicating that the 
decision to either protect health or protect imports is product specific.  
 
Despite the fact that the EU sets one of the strictest collection of standards in the world, and 
international standards like Codex have been posited as those that maximize global social 
welfare, EU standards are not always the more stringent of the two and neither is it always 
the case that they are trade inhibiting. Thus, a caveat is worth mentioning: although we found 
international standards to have, at times, a weaker trade enhancing effect than domestic 
standards, this is not to say that countries should refrain from the usage of globally acceptable 
standards as recommended by the WTO. Clearly more research is needed in this direction 
with extensions to other product lines and importing countries. 
 
Conclusively, from a policy point of view, an important policy implication of our findings is 
that overly protective standards can have huge trade inhibiting effects on developing 
countries. Although many African countries are in regional trade agreements with the EU, 
standards make market access penetration conditional, as most of the existing regional trade 
agreements were negotiated on the basis of reduced tariffs and not on the transfer of technical 
or financial resources to increase conformity to standards. Thus, increased capacity building 
and transfer of technology would be a welcome policy if the numerous regional trade 
agreements that the EU has with Africa are to help in achieving the continent’s 
developmental goals. Consequently, even if standards are used as a protectionist tool, the 
effect might be dampened for these countries. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: List of Countries in the Dataset 
Country Groups Members 
Importers (EU) Belgium, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
Exporters (Africa) Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt Arab Republic, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Togo, Zambia.  
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